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Abstract: In a world that’s more and more internationalist, interconnected, where the power of 
capitalism and internet has grown significantly over the past decade and so, the very existence of an 
isolated and totalitarian regime such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea raises many 
questions about its future as state. A good number of opinions and speculations have been made 
public over prospects’ of Pyongyang’s regime and its transition towards another regime or collapse. It 
is important to follow these studies in order to better understand and anticipate as much as possible 
future actions and policies taken by a country that follows only its own internal rules while ignoring 
those general accepted by the international community. Therefore, the aim of the following study is to 
summarize and to point the most important aspects of what keeps North Korea in the spotlight and 
how two of the most important shapers of the international reality position themselves towards the 
nuclear program, whose development has strong implications for the entire world. 
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Introduction 
Even if history teaches us that the Cold War has ended in 1991, another one is 
taking place right now in Asia, where regional major powers have engaged in a 
strategic and economic competition. As long as the North Korean regime – a 
mixture of communism and national fascism – continues to exist, to arm itself and 
expressly develop its nuclear program regardless of the consequences, the cold war 
of Northeast Asia’s history doesn’t show signs of ending too soon (Kaplan, 2016). 
Since the armistice of the Korean War in 1953, United States, one of the main 
actors of the old Cold War, has been fully engaged in the region supporting 
economically and military the Republic of Korea (South Korea), balancing 
therefore the Chinese influence in the Korean Peninsula. Closely positioned 
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geographically and with interests in the same area, Russia and Japan often react to 
Pyongyang’s actions, however their engagement’s level on the dispute is low. 
On the other hand, a modest position has been adopted by the United Nations too in 
response to North Korea’s provocations. The Security Council has indeed adopted 
five major resolutions since 2006 that imposed and strengthened sanctions on 
Pyongyang for continuing to develop its nuclear weapons program and demanded 
it to refrain from ballistic missile tests.  
It is commonly accepted on international level that North Korea’s actions violate 
the UN resolutions and the international law, threatening as a result the regional 
and international peace and stability. Yet, the efforts to keep under control the 
North-Korean threat over the last decades and particularly after the accession to 
power in Pyongyang of Kim Jon-un in December 2011 have been unsuccessful in 
preventing his regime from advancing its programs, the last nuclear test standing as 
an indisputable proof of the country’s intransigence. 
Moreover, in addition to UN’s efforts of achieving the goal of denuclearization of 
the Korean peninsula, the Six-Party Talks project – United States, China, Russia, 
Japan, South Korea, North Korea (2003-2009) has proved to be a failure (Chang, 
2016) and its causes rest on one hand on the pursuit of its own interests and 
priorities by each of the involved parties and on the other hand on its fears. What 
the project, alongside the UN sanctions, did succeed is solely an isolation of the 
North-Korean state. 
 
1. North Korea’s Ambitions 
With an intensive military activity, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has 
become alarming within less than 5 years. Only this year, the 4th nuclear test was 
conducted on 6th January and other 9 attempts of North Korea launching short, mid 
or long-range missiles were registered, the last two being tested on 22nd June. 
Feeling highly insecure as it lost the extensive Soviet and Chinese support that 
helped it recover after the Korean War (1950-1953) and so it fell further behind a 
far more prosperous South Korea, North Korea pursued nuclear weapons to 
compensate the new fragile internal condition and to improve the country’s image 
inside and outside its borders. 
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However, this anxiety and weakness grew under Kim Jong-Un’s regime, who 
announced his father's bequest of a nuclear program as a crowning achievement, 
changed the constitution in order to declare North Korea a nuclear state and 
declared nuclear and economic development as his top priorities (Snyder, 2016). 
Although the Six-Party Talks mentioned before reached some key agreements, 
most of the problems with implementation persisted and, by consequence, the talks 
have been suspended throughout the Obama administration (Rinehart, Nikitin & 
Chanlett-Avery, 2016). 
North Korea took advantage of the fact that diplomacy remained stalled and 
continued to develop its nuclear and missile programs in the absence of any 
agreement it considered binding so far. Last summer a North-Korean official 
asserted that the nuclear deterrent is “not a plaything to be put on the negotiating 
table, as it is the essential means to protect its sovereignty and vital rights from the 
US nuclear threat and hostile policy which have lasted for more than half a 
century” (Mullen, 2015).  
Each time North Korea is calling for peace, as it contends that the talks should be 
held to “defuse the military tension on the Korean Peninsula and build mutual trust 
between the South and North Korean military in order to break away from the 
disgraceful past and move on to a new beginning” (Kim Tae-woo, 2016), the 
regime is in fact returning to the table only to buy time to carry on building and 
testing weapons technologies. 
Its behavior can be explained by examining two aspects: first, any new 
missile/nuclear test is a proof that Pyongyang’s regime is pursuing for international 
recognition for its country as nuclear power and at the same time it responds to any 
new set of sanctions adopted against it or to any joint military exercise between US 
and South Korea.  
Second, it must not be forgotten that the more insecure a country is inside, the 
more aggressive is outside, seeking to ensure its long-term survival. Although 
some economic and agricultural reforms were announced in 2014 and a modest 
growth has been visible since, the country remains mainly impoverished. As one 
economist described the situation: “the new normal of North Korean food security 
seems to be increasing choice for the privileged elite, chronic insecurity for a non-
trivial share of the non-elite” (Noland, 2016). There is also a critically low energy 
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supply and dilapidated infrastructure and a brutal leadership that can hardly make 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea a stable and consolidated state. 
 
2. The United States – North Korea Relations 
The new American administration that came into office in 2009 promised to solve 
national security challenges by engaging in an unconditional dialogue with the 
leaders of regimes like North Korea. Pyongyang’s regime has just conducted the 
same year its 2nd nuclear test, determining the approval by the UN Security Council 
of the Resolution 1874. The United Stated pleaded for this new set of sanctions, but 
soon abandoned the strategy and chose the policy of “strategic patience”, patience 
that turned out to be “a recipe for non-action” (Green, 2016). 
This is the international context that led North Korea to conduct its 3rd nuclear test 
on February 2013 and 2 long-range rocket tests. Moreover, North Korea's National 
Defense Commission admitted that its country will continue nuclear testing and 
long-range rocket launches, all of which are a part of an “upcoming all-out action” 
aimed at the United States, “the sworn enemy of the Korean people” (Griffiths, 
2016). 
Unlike Clinton and Bush administration for which the North-Korean nuclear issue 
represented a priority in its foreign policy (check the concept of “Axis of evil” 
addressed for the first time in 2002 by president George W. Bush and grouping 
together Iran, Iraq and North Korea), the Obama administration approached it more 
of an “inconvenient exception to the proposition that dialogue could turn enemies 
into friends” (Green, 2016). 
The American policy toward North Korea pursued to put pressure on the regime 
while demanding Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks. The main elements 
of this approach involve insisting that Pyongyang commits to steps toward 
denuclearization, closely coordinating with treaty allies Japan and South Korea, 
attempting to convince China to take a tougher line on North Korea and applying 
pressure on Pyongyang through arms interdictions and sanctions (Albert & Xu, 
2016). 
Contrary to same opinions, the economic sanctions on Pyongyang are much 
narrower than those put on Iran before the administration’s nuclear deal with 
Tehran and an analysis conducted by Fletcher Security Review shows how 
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incomplete they really are (Stanton, 2015). And one of the reasons is that, until 
now, the American policy was conceived in order “to bring the North to its senses, 
not to its knees”, according to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel (Chang, 2016). Also, over the last couple of years, 
United Stated built its approach based on the knowledge that North Korea's pace of 
nuclear and missile development was not rapid enough to enable Pyongyang to be 
able to directly strike the American territory. 
In spite of that, the last months have brought a relative change of strategy at 
Washington. Recently, the US Treasury Department named North Korea as a 
“primary money laundering concern” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2016). In 
the past, Pyongyang was also accused of “nuclear proliferation” and “human rights 
abuses”. The response came shortly after, but even though the North Korean state 
asserts that it is not afraid of these labels, the additional measures that will be 
adopted represent a real concern as banks and other financial institutions, both 
American and foreign, will not handle dollar transactions for Pyongyang’s entities 
and fronts and probably will also shun dealings in other currencies for these 
customers (Chang, 2016). 
The current U.S. policy toward North Korea continues to rely on diplomacy, being 
characterized by three aims: to maintain the strongest possible deterrent against 
Pyongyang, to sustain pressure on Pyongyang through sanctions, and to engage in 
diplomacy with Pyongyang (Philipp, 2016). 
However, what is frustrating for the US attempts to isolate and pressure the regime 
is China’s deepening economic engagement with North Korea. As this engagement 
continues, it is becoming increasingly difficult to sanction North Korea without 
impinging on Chinese commercial and economic interests (Konishi, 2011). 
 
3. China’s Close Ties to Pyongyang 
When addressing North Korea’s nuclear program and the foreign positions adopted 
with regards to Pyongyang’s policies, there is an argument that arises often: 
“Washington can do little without the cooperation of China” (Stanton, 2015). The 
opinion can be justified if we take into consideration that China shares with North 
Korea one of its longest land border and it’s its best and sometimes it’s only ally, 
responsible for supporting Pyongyang with food and oil supplies. There is no doubt 
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that People's Republic of China has the deepest knowledge of the North Korean 
state (Kaplan, 2016). 
Since the road to Pyongyang passes through Beijing, as United States tried several 
times, a solution for the tense situation in the Peninsula would be the negotiation 
with China in order to lift the sanctions level imposed to North Korea, so they can 
generate a real impact. The approach should concentrate on delivering a common 
plan of measures in sectors that matter for Kim Jong-Un (Stravidis, 2016). 
China has long been willing to accept this type of approach, trying at the same time 
to avoid a clear path so it doesn’t have future issues no matter what will happen to 
its North-Korean neighbor. Currently, Beijing if satisfied with the status-quo 
present in the Peninsula as it offers a buffer zone between its borders and the 
democratic Republic of Korea. Besides that, a turmoil that would break open as a 
consequence to a forced change of the regime would spread in its territory too. 
An example of this “balanced policy” would be the statement of Chinese Foreign 
Affairs Minister following the military tests held by Pyongyang this February. He 
advised United States and North Korea to initiate negotiations in order to discuss 
and surpass their bilateral issues.  
On the other hand, to show its support, taking advantage of the Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue in China’s capital this year, President Xi Jinping pledged 
China would “completely and fully” enforce the UN’s coercive measures. 
However, this wouldn’t be the first time China complies with international 
sanctions on North Korea, without really interrupting the flow of materials and 
components for Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, such as cylinders of 
uranium hexafluoride, or vacuum pumps, valves and computers (Chang, 2016). 
This is one of the reasons South Korea continues to raise criticism over what they 
perceive as Beijing’s prioritization of stability over denuclearization and dialogue 
over sanctions and pressure. At this point, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson 
stated on 5th February that “we have a different definition of more serious 
measures” (Snyder & Byun, 2016). 
A possible way to convince the Beijing regime to truly and efficiently cooperate 
would be the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, proposed by Washington and 
accepted by Seoul. Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed his country’s concern 
about the US's such a probable move as the system “goes far beyond the defense 
need of the Korean Peninsula. It will reach deep into the hinterland of Asia, which 
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will not only directly damage China's strategic security interests, but also do harm 
to the security interests of other countries in this region” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2016). 
 
5. Conclusions 
While North Korean state remains unpredictable and opaque, security analysts 
continue to be concerned about its growing nuclear capability, as well as the 
potential for proliferation to other actors. Also, even though the primary focus of 
the international community rests on the nuclear weapons program, there are other 
contentious issues to be followed, such as Pyongyang’s missile programs, the 
conventional military forces, the illicit activities and the human rights violations 
(Nikitin, Rinehart & Chanlett-Avery, 2016). 
But the general agreement is that the first step to solve the North-Korean problem 
is the denuclearization. Some experts argue that tougher sanctions would help 
determine Pyongyang to give up its nuclear capabilities, others that China’s 
intervention in either accepting the Korean unification or forcing a replacement of 
Kim Jong-un regime with a different leadership would be the key in the 
denuclearization process. Also, there are voices that hope to take advantage of 
North Korea’s pursuit of provocations to undermine international and domestic 
support for the Kim regime and analysts who believe the continued dialogue with 
Pyongyang is an essential step in “probing North Korea’s intentions” (Snyder, 
2015). Ultimately, a combination of all these visions could turn out to be successful 
in solving the Nord-Korean affair. 
However, there solutions would need a frame. Even if the United Nations provide a 
neutral space for cooperation, debate and resolutions’ adoption, the functioning 
mechanism (coalition-led decisions) makes it difficult to take actions fast and 
efficiently as it demands unanimous consent. Another option would be the return to 
Six-party Talks, an alternative that may not turn out to be successful because of its 
core target – convincing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. In exchange, 
the strategic triangle United States – Republic of Korea – China has become a 
prominent mechanism for managing regional crises in the short term and for 
shaping a future security structure in Northeast Asia over the long term (Konishi, 
2011). An enhanced cooperation and coordination among these three nations could 
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lead to a more effective diplomatic approach to negotiating the denuclearization of 
North Korea.  
Beside all, the optimal outcome remains, presumably, the reunification of the 
Korean Peninsula under a stable and democratic rule. The road to that result seems 
yet to imply a great number of risks: the potential for major strategic consequences 
(including competition for control of the North’s nuclear arsenal), a massive 
humanitarian crisis, long-term strategic, economic and social repercussions. In the 
meantime, hardest sanctions should be imposed and also their strict 
implementation. 
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